Political power and economic policy : theory, analysis, and empirical applications / Gordon C. Rausser, Johan Swinnen, Pinhas Zusman.
2011
HN49.P6 R38 2011eb
Formats
Format | |
---|---|
BibTeX | |
MARCXML | |
TextMARC | |
MARC | |
DublinCore | |
EndNote | |
NLM | |
RefWorks | |
RIS |
Linked e-resources
Details
Title
Political power and economic policy : theory, analysis, and empirical applications / Gordon C. Rausser, Johan Swinnen, Pinhas Zusman.
Author
ISBN
9781139127929 (electronic bk.)
1139127926 (electronic bk.)
9780511978661 (electronic bk.)
0511978669 (electronic bk.)
9781139117265
1139117262
113911509X
9781139115094
9780521190169
0521190169
9780521148009
0521148006
9781139115094
1283314940
9781283314947
9786613314949
6613314943
1139123009
9781139123006
1139112902
9781139112901
1139127926 (electronic bk.)
9780511978661 (electronic bk.)
0511978669 (electronic bk.)
9781139117265
1139117262
113911509X
9781139115094
9780521190169
0521190169
9780521148009
0521148006
9781139115094
1283314940
9781283314947
9786613314949
6613314943
1139123009
9781139123006
1139112902
9781139112901
Imprint
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Language
English
Language Note
English.
Description
1 online resource (xvi, 519 pages) : illustrations
Call Number
HN49.P6 R38 2011eb
System Control No.
(OCoLC)772458473
Summary
"This book analyzes the links between political economics, governance structures and the distribution of political power in economic policy making. The book theoretically explains and empirically quantifies these interactions. The analysis includes both public good policies and redistributive policies. Part I of the book presents the conceptual foundations of political-economic bargaining and interest group analysis. After presenting the underlying theory, Part II of the book examines ideology, prescription and political power coefficients; Part III analyzes a number of specific structures; and Part IV presents a framework for political econometrics with a number of empirical applications and testable hypotheses. In all four parts of the book, four analytical dimensions of public policy are distinguished: governance structures, political economy, mechanism design and incidence"--Provided by publisher
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 489-514) and index.
Formatted Contents Note
Part I. Political Power and Economic Analysis: 1. Public policy: the lens of political economy; 2. The Nash solution to the bargaining problem; 3. The Harsanyi solution to the bargaining problem; 4. Political-economic analysis; 5. Normative political-economic analysis; 6. Dynamic political-economic analysis
Part II. Ideology, Prescription, and Political Power Coefficients: 7. Political power, ideology, and political organizational structures; 8. Political power, influence, and lobbying; 9. Constitutional prescription and political power coefficients
Part III. Analysis of Specific Structures: 10. The political economy of commodity market intervention; 11. The political economy of public research and development; 12. Political-economic analysis of redistributive policy and public good investments; 13. Interest groups, coalition breaking, and productive policies; 14. Policy reform and compensation; 15. Political-economic analysis of land reform; 16. Political-economic analysis of water resource systems; 17. The political-economic lens on quality and public standard regulations; 18. Political-economic analysis in transition economies; 19. The power of bureaucracies: the European commission and EU policy reforms
Part IV. Empirical Applications of Political Power Estimation: 20. Political econometrics; 21. The political econometrics of the Israeli dairy industry; 22. Flexible policy instruments given a political power distribution; 23. Estimating statistical properties of power weight parameters and their temporal shifts; 24. Role of institutions in the joint determination of PERTs and PESTs.
Part II. Ideology, Prescription, and Political Power Coefficients: 7. Political power, ideology, and political organizational structures; 8. Political power, influence, and lobbying; 9. Constitutional prescription and political power coefficients
Part III. Analysis of Specific Structures: 10. The political economy of commodity market intervention; 11. The political economy of public research and development; 12. Political-economic analysis of redistributive policy and public good investments; 13. Interest groups, coalition breaking, and productive policies; 14. Policy reform and compensation; 15. Political-economic analysis of land reform; 16. Political-economic analysis of water resource systems; 17. The political-economic lens on quality and public standard regulations; 18. Political-economic analysis in transition economies; 19. The power of bureaucracies: the European commission and EU policy reforms
Part IV. Empirical Applications of Political Power Estimation: 20. Political econometrics; 21. The political econometrics of the Israeli dairy industry; 22. Flexible policy instruments given a political power distribution; 23. Estimating statistical properties of power weight parameters and their temporal shifts; 24. Role of institutions in the joint determination of PERTs and PESTs.
Digital File Characteristics
data file
Source of Description
Print version record.
Added Author
Available in Other Form
Print version: Rausser, Gordon C. Political power and economic policy. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011
Linked Resources
Record Appears in