Lawyer barons : what their contingency fees really cost America / Lester Brickman.
2011
KF310.C6 B75 2011eb
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Details
Title
Lawyer barons : what their contingency fees really cost America / Lester Brickman.
Author
ISBN
9780511993336 (electronic bk.)
0511993331 (electronic bk.)
0511989539 (electronic bk.)
9780511989537 (electronic bk.)
9780511976551 (electronic bk.)
0511976550 (electronic bk.)
9781107001220
1107001226
9780521189491
0521189497
0511993331 (electronic bk.)
0511989539 (electronic bk.)
9780511989537 (electronic bk.)
9780511976551 (electronic bk.)
0511976550 (electronic bk.)
9781107001220
1107001226
9780521189491
0521189497
Imprint
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xxv, 556 pages)
Call Number
KF310.C6 B75 2011eb
System Control No.
(OCoLC)705001598
Summary
This book is a broad and deep inquiry into how contingency fees distort our civil justice system, influence our political system and endanger democratic governance. Contingency fees are the way personal injury lawyers finance access to the courts for those wrongfully injured. Although the public senses that lawyers manipulate the justice system to serve their own ends, few are aware of the high costs that come with contingency fees. This book sets out to change that, providing a window into the seamy underworld of contingency fees that the bar and the courts not only tolerate but even protect and nurture. Contrary to a broad academic consensus, the book argues that the financial incentives for lawyers to litigate are so inordinately high that they perversely impact our civil justice system and impose other unconscionable costs. It thus presents the intellectual architecture that underpins all tort reform efforts.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Formatted Contents Note
The origin of the contingency fee
How profitable are contingency fees?
Are contingency fee profits "reasonable"?
How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition
Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition
The effects of incentives created by contingency fees
How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system
Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability
The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion
Current and future expansions of tort liability
The litigation explosion : "fact or fiction"?
Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability
The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs
The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates
Class actions
Fees in class actions
How class action lawyers game fee setting
Securities class actions
Regulation through litigation
For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers.
How profitable are contingency fees?
Are contingency fee profits "reasonable"?
How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition
Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition
The effects of incentives created by contingency fees
How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system
Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability
The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion
Current and future expansions of tort liability
The litigation explosion : "fact or fiction"?
Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability
The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs
The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates
Class actions
Fees in class actions
How class action lawyers game fee setting
Securities class actions
Regulation through litigation
For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers.
Source of Description
Print version record.
Available in Other Form
Print version: Brickman, Lester, 1940- Lawyer barons. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011
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