Self-policing in politics : the political economy of reputational controls on politicians / Glenn R. Parker.
2004
JA79 .P353 2004
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Details
Title
Self-policing in politics : the political economy of reputational controls on politicians / Glenn R. Parker.
ISBN
9780691225432 (electronic bk.)
0691225435 (electronic bk.)
069111739X (hardcover ; acid-free paper)
9780691117393 (hardcover ; acid-free paper)
0691225435 (electronic bk.)
069111739X (hardcover ; acid-free paper)
9780691117393 (hardcover ; acid-free paper)
Published
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [2004]
Copyright
©2004
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (x, 180 pages)
Call Number
JA79 .P353 2004
System Control No.
(OCoLC)1200556195
Summary
"Just as businesses' poor behavior can cause brand names to be tarnished, prices to plummet, and future business to disappear, dishonest politicians stand to sacrifice the human capital invested in their careers, and premiums for honesty, such as electoral security and prestigious post-elective employment. Parker explores public attitudes toward the behavior of members of Congress and shows how those attitudes shape the way members conduct their professional lives. Written from the perspective of public choice, this book offers a novel approach to the question of how to keep politicians honest."--Jacket.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 169-176) and index.
Formatted Contents Note
What is opportunism and how do we control it?
How reputations control cheating in economics and politics
Problems in the market for legislators
Hypotheses, measurement, and data
Constraining opportunism through self-policing
Reputational capital and job security; or, If trustworthy legislators are at a premium, are they paid one?
Weaknesses in reputational controls.
How reputations control cheating in economics and politics
Problems in the market for legislators
Hypotheses, measurement, and data
Constraining opportunism through self-policing
Reputational capital and job security; or, If trustworthy legislators are at a premium, are they paid one?
Weaknesses in reputational controls.
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