Good intentions, bad outcomes : social policy, informality, and economic growth in Mexico / Santiago Levy.
2008
331.10973 L668g 2008
Available at 3rd Floor
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Title
Good intentions, bad outcomes : social policy, informality, and economic growth in Mexico / Santiago Levy.
Author
ISBN
9780815752196 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0815752199 (pbk. : alk. paper)
0815752199 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Imprint
Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, c2008.
Language
English
Description
xv, 357 p. : ill., map ; 24 cm.
Call Number
331.10973 L668g 2008
System Control No.
(OCoLC)185691095
(OCoLC)185691095
(OCoLC)185691095
Summary
"Argues that incoherent social programs significantly contribute to poverty and little growth. Proposes converting the existing social security system into universal social entitlements. Advocates eliminating wage-based social security contributions and raising consumption taxes on higher-income households to increase the rate of GDP growth, reduce inequality, and improve benefits for workers"--Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 343-347) and index.
Formatted Contents Note
Institutions, workers and social programs
Formality and informality
Workers' valuation of social programs
Mobility of workers in the labor market
Social programs, welfare and productivity
Productivity and illegal firms
Investment growth under informality
Social programs and the fiscal accounts
Can social policy increase welfare and growth?
Resources for social programs
Regional coverage of social programs
Land holdings of Progresa-Oportunidades Households
Estimation of Mexico's economically active population
Mean wage-rate comparison by matching methods
Equilibrium in the labor market with differences in workers' valuations
Equilibrium in the labor market with evasion of Social Security
Profit maximization under informality
Further remarks on retirement pensions as a social entitlement.
Formality and informality
Workers' valuation of social programs
Mobility of workers in the labor market
Social programs, welfare and productivity
Productivity and illegal firms
Investment growth under informality
Social programs and the fiscal accounts
Can social policy increase welfare and growth?
Resources for social programs
Regional coverage of social programs
Land holdings of Progresa-Oportunidades Households
Estimation of Mexico's economically active population
Mean wage-rate comparison by matching methods
Equilibrium in the labor market with differences in workers' valuations
Equilibrium in the labor market with evasion of Social Security
Profit maximization under informality
Further remarks on retirement pensions as a social entitlement.
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